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Abstract. The practice of model-building is very common in analytic philosophical 
theology. Yet many other theologians worry that any attempt to model God must be 
hubristic and idolatrous. A better understanding of scientific modeling can set the stage 
for a more fruitful engagement between analytic theologians and their critics. I first 
present an account of scientific modeling that draws on recent work in the philosophy 
of science. I then apply that account to a prominent analytic model of the trinity, Michael 
Rea and Jeffrey Brower’s “material constitution model.” I argue that modeling – whether 
scientific or theological – need not be understood as a hubristic enterprise. A model 
does not always try to grasp its target at all, let alone grasp it fully and completely. Even 
theologians who are committed to a strong doctrine of divine mystery can therefore 
find value in analytic modeling.
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In what might be regarded as the foundational document of the analytic 
theology movement, Michael Rea says that Christian theologians should 
understand their “theoretical task” as “one that involves clarifying, system-
atizing, and model-building” (Crisp and Rea 2009, 19). Two of these three 
suggestions are relatively uncontroversial: no one opposes clarity as such; 
and few oppose systematicity as such. Yet many theologians do remain 
uneasy about “model-building,” and especially about analytic model-build-
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ing. They worry that any attempt to model God can only be idolatrous – an 
example of theoretical hubris run amuck.
The rhetoric of “modeling” is very common in analytic philosophical 
theology. Analytic theologians have offered social models and Latin models 
of the trinity; they have modeled God’s three-in-oneness on time traveling 
Rockettes as well as on multiple-personality disorder. They have similarly 
offered kenotic models and “two minds” models of the incarnation (Leftow 
2004, Hasker 2013, Forrest 2000, Morris 1996).1 Like the term “theory,” the 
term “model” is often used loosely in academic writing to mean just “an 
account” or “a way of understanding.” On a slightly more precise under-
standing, however, a model is a structure that is meant to represent some 
object or target.2 Scientists build models in order to infer conclusions about 
the (relatively inaccessible) phenomena those models represent.
Model-building is a common strategy scientists employ to understand complex 
phenomena and systems, especially when other strategies such as direct ex-
perimentation and observation are made impractical or impossible due to, for 
example, the target’s being too big or too small, or difficult to locate, handle, 
and measure with precision. Under circumstances like these, it can be less cum-
bersome and more illuminating to deal with graphs, diagrams, mathematical 
equations, physical representations, computer simulations, etc., than with the 
“real world” (Sanches de Oliveira 2013).
Analytic theologians do not claim to be scientists, but they often do con-
struct models in this more precise sense. The conceptual move, as with 
1 A recent survey of philosophical theology on the incarnation also identifies “phys-
icalist transformational models,” “dualist transformational models,” “relational 
models,” “prophetic models, compositionalist models, two-mind models, and kenot-
ic models” (Marmodoro and Hill 2011, 1–19).
2 “A model is an imagined or hypothetical structure that we describe and investigate 
in the hope of using it to understand some more complex, real-world ‘target’ sys-
tem or domain. Understanding is achieved via a resemblance relation, that is, some 
relevant similarity, between the model and the real-world target system” (God-
frey-Smith 2006, 7). Given the close links – both conceptual and sociological – be-
tween analytic metaphysics and analytic theology, Godfrey-Smith’s work on model-
ing in metaphysics is very useful for understanding modeling in analytic theology. 
See also Godfrey-Smith 2012, 97–113.
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scientific modeling, is from the comparatively available model to the com-
paratively unavailable target. For example, according to Rea, an analytic 
theologian writing about the Trinity will often present “a model or analogy 
that helps us to see how it might be coherent to say that there is one god 
but three divine persons… The models are heuristic devices aimed at mak-
ing the doctrine intelligible” (Rea 2009, 4). Like other scientific (or, indeed, 
metaphysical) models, these analytic theological models “are constructed 
in a way that involves deliberate simplification, or other imaginative mod-
ification of reality, in order to make some relationships visible or problems 
tractable” (Godfrey-Smith 2012, 98). Thus, although the target of their re-
spective models may differ, analytic theological modeling and scientific 
modeling initially seem similar with respect to their goals and methods.
Herein lies the worry. In scientific inquiry, it is useful to construct de-
liberate simplifications aimed at making problems more tractable; but in 
properly theological inquiry, these constructions smack of hubris and idol-
atry – at least, according to many theologians.3 The Christian God is “the 
God who made the world and everything in it, the Lord of heaven and earth, 
who does not dwell in temples built by human hands” (Acts 17:24). This God 
is utterly beyond comprehension and so presumably cannot be explained 
or modeled at all. To think otherwise is to misunderstand God, and to mis-
understand theology: “Because God, who can never be fully comprehended, 
lies at the heart of all theological enquiry, theology by its nature is not 
a problem solving enterprise, but rather a mystery discerning enterprise” 
(Weinandy 2000, 32). On this view, then, an analytic model of the trinity, for 
example, must idolatrously treat the trinity as a problem to be solved, rather 
3 Such theologians would say that when we think about God, and especially when we 
think about God philosophically, we are highly likely to fall into the error of “con-
ceptual idolatry” – constructing a mental concept of God (a simulacrum) which then 
replaces the real God as our object of inquiry and worship. Conceptual idolatry is 
closely linked to the related error of “ontotheology” – roughly, regarding God as 
the biggest, most powerful creature rather than as the transcendent, unknowable 
Creator. For a powerful version of this line of argument see Marion 1991. See also 
Burrell 2008 177–189, 205–212; for pushback, see Cross 2008; 190–96, Hasker 2008; 
197–204; Crisp and Rea 2009, 22–25.
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than as a mystery to be discerned.4 The same would hold, mutatis mutandis, 
for other analytic theological models. In other words, analytic theological 
modeling errs because it tries to approximate scientific modeling.
It is easy for critics to associate analytic theological modeling with 
modeling in the natural sciences, and so it is easy for them to assume that 
analytic models of God seek to comprehend their target “scientifically” – 
that is, fully and completely.5 Because a full and complete comprehension 
of the triune God or the incarnate Word seems not only impossible but 
idolatrous, many theologians reject the whole task of analytic modeling. 
Yet this rejection, however theologically astute, is also driven by false as-
sumptions about scientific modeling. It is not the case that all scientific 
models aim at a full and complete comprehension of their targets. It is 
not even the case that they must have ‘real-world’ targets at all. A better 
account of scientific modeling can therefore help us to see what analytic 
theological models are (and are not) trying to accomplish.
The suggestion that we should compare theological modeling with sci-
entific modeling is not a new one. A sprawling literature, stretching across 
decades, makes this very point (e.g., Ramsey 1964, Barbour 1974, Soskice 
1985). That literature remains valuable, but it is now somewhat out of 
date. I say this for three reasons. First, there has recently been a resurgence 
of interest in modeling among philosophers of science (Weisberg 2013, 
4 “By abstracting from the economy of salvation, apologetic reason risks creating the 
impression that the doctrine has an independent standing as a problem to be solved 
or that the logic of trinitarian discourse is at risk unless and until Christians can 
show that it is not subject to philosophical objections. But this is to mistake the role 
of a doctrine for that of an explanatory theory which should only be accepted on 
condition that it can be shown to be coherent, not only with the scriptural witness, 
but with neutral reason” (Moore 2011, 399–400). According to Catherine Mowry 
LaCugna (1986, 177), “As long as the doctrine of the trinity is reduced to a puzzle 
of the sort, ‘how can three be one?’ no real advance in understanding it can take 
place.” For similar, though more general, criticism, see Williams 2000, 13, 134, 137; 
Williams 2014, 180–81; Marion 2002, 53–70; Milbank 2009, 320.
5 Few if any scientists would think that scientific modeling aims at full and complete 
comprehension, of course. Presumably, this is the theological worry nevertheless: 
because analytic philosophers of religion and theologians treat theology as a prob-
lem-solving enterprise, they assume that their own theological models are complete 
unqualified solutions that close off further inquiry by rendering it otiose.
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Giere 1988, Godfrey-Smith 2006, Wimsatt 2007, Odenbaugh 2005, Strev-
ens 2007). As our account of scientific modeling evolves, so too must our 
account of the proper relationship between scientific and theological mod-
eling. Second, in recent decades, contemporary academic theologians have 
reasserted the absolute transcendence and unknowability of God, which 
goes hand-in-hand with a newfound respect for apophatic theology. The 
more we insist that God is unknowable, the more problematic the practice 
of modeling God becomes. The existing literature on theological mode-
ling has not really come to terms with this renewal of apophatic thought. 
Finally, the literature on theological modeling predates the rise of analytic 
philosophical theology. Previous accounts of theological modeling tended 
to treat “models” of God as little more than well-developed metaphors. By 
contrast, analytic models of God seem to be much more akin to properly 
scientific models. 6 It is therefore even more imperative to compare analytic 
theological modeling with scientific modeling.
A better understanding of scientific modeling can set the stage for 
a more fruitful engagement between analytic theologians and their critics. 
In what follows, I first present a more sophisticated account of scientific 
modeling, one that draws on recent work in the philosophy of science. 
I then apply that account to a prominent analytic model of the trinity, Mi-
chael Rea and Jeffrey Brower’s “material constitution model.” I argue that 
modeling – whether scientific or theological – need not be understood as 
a hubristic enterprise. A model does not always try to grasp its target at 
all, let alone grasp it fully and completely. To develop this point further, 
I return to the worry outlined above, and argue that even theologians who 
are committed to a strong doctrine of divine mystery can still find value 
in analytic modeling.
6 For example, John Polkinghorne (1998, 23) writes: “Theology often has recourse to 
models. It may speak of God as stern Judge or merciful Father… tension between the 
two models is resolved by considering the differing experiences to which they apply 
(human repentance/divine acceptance in the case of Judge/Father.” Polkinghorne’s 
“models” of God as father or judge seem more like metaphors that simply re-occur 
extensively in scripture and tradition. I trust it is clear that the analytic philosoph-
ical models under discussion differ considerably, and are much closer to scientific 
models.
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1. Contemporary Philosophy of Science  
on Models and Model-Building
Consider some typical scientific models. Models can be concrete, three-di-
mensional physical objects. For example, a chemist might construct a mod-
el of a molecule using balls and sticks to stand in for atoms and the bonds 
that join them. The model need not be three-dimensional, however: the 
chemist might construct the same model merely by drawing circles and 
lines. Other scientific models are entirely abstract. The Lotka-Volterra 
model of predation is composed of differential equations that describe the 
way populations of predators and prey interact in an ecosystem. Some-
times, a scientific model does not even attempt to depict its target system 
accurately or comprehensively. A model can deliberately introduce false 
assumptions, as when models of bodies in motion assume that the bodies 
are perfect spheres that move through frictionless planes (McMullin 1985, 
247–273; Weisberg 2013, 98–113). Alternatively, models can focus only on 
the relevant features of the target system and ignore real features that are 
deemed unimportant to the current investigation. For example, a simple 
model of voting behavior might focus only on voters’ disposable income 
and political party identification, while ignoring, say, their level of educa-
tion, or whether they have children. As with modeling in general, in both of 
the latter cases, the point is to simplify the target system in order to make 
studying it more tractable.
Among contemporary philosophers of science, no single account – no 
model – of modeling has commanded widespread agreement. It is not easy 
to say exactly what all scientific models have in common or to give a gen-
eral theory of the practice of modeling. A model is some kind of representa-
tion – that much is clear. It is also clear that a model represents its target 
system by resembling it, however remotely.7 A group of billiard balls is like 
7 “An object or state-of-affairs is a model when it is viewed in terms of its resem-
blance, real or hypothetical, to some other object or state of affairs; a miniature train 
is a model of the full-scale one, a jam jar full of cigarette ends is seen as a model for 
the lungs of a smoker, the behavior of water is seen as the model for the action of 
electricity” (Soskice 1985, 101).
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a group of gas molecules in some ways (given certain assumptions, they 
behave in similar ways) but not in all ways (gas molecules are not colored, 
and are not made of the same material). The same formal feature of sim-
ilarity-in-difference characterizes other models as well. The resemblance 
relationship that a model establishes with its target system can be very 
remote. For example, in the case of mathematical models, relationships 
between points in mathematical space represent the relationships that 
obtain between real-world objects. In other words, a model is not just a rep-
resentation of its target system, but an analogous representation. As Mary 
Hesse succinctly puts it: “Models are relata of analogy relations; that is, 
a model is an analogue” (2000, 299).
Model-building is therefore a form of analogical reasoning. To say that 
a model represents its target is just to say that the salient features of the 
model are analogous to the salient features of the target. In a sense, all 
models are analogies – or, more precisely, all models represent their targets 
in virtue of analogical relations. But even though all models are analogies, it 
is not the case that all analogies are models. Consider this simple, four-part, 
analogy: Paris is to France as Madrid is to Spain. This analogy asserts that 
Paris bears the same relation to France (“is the capital of”) that Madrid bears 
to Spain. But “Paris is to France as Madrid is to Spain” is not a model, in part 
because it is not intended to represent any comparatively unknown target.
In my view, Michael Weisberg offers the best contemporary philosoph-
ical account of scientific modeling in his 2013 book Simulation and Simi-
larity: Using Models to Explain the World. According to Weisberg, a model is 
“an interpreted structure that can be used to represent a real or imagined 
phenomenon” (15). He divides scientific models into three general types 
according to their structure: concrete models are physical structures, math-
ematical models are mathematical structures, and computational models 
are algorithmic structures (24–31).8 Models are interpreted structures be-
8 Concrete models need not actually exist as physical objects. They can also exist as 
conceptual representations, or what Weisberg calls “idealized exemplars.” For ex-
ample, the ball-and-stick model of a molecule would still count as a concrete model, 
even if it were never physically built or even pictorially depicted.
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cause model-builders must specify exactly how their models should be con-
strued so that they represent the target system as intended. According to 
Weisberg, a model’s construal first specifies how the features of the target 
system should be mapped onto parts of the model. In the model of a mole-
cule, for example, one must specify that the different colors of the balls and 
the way they are arranged represent different kinds of atoms. A construal 
also specifies the model’s scope, since the model is intended to represent 
some, but not all, features of the target system. (The uniform spherical 
shape of the balls is not meant to represent the complex internal structure 
of real atoms, for example). Finally, the model-builder must explicitly spec-
ify the model’s “fidelity criteria,” namely “how similar the model must be 
to the world in order to be considered an adequate representation” (41). In 
the case of a molecule, an adequate ball-and-stick model must successfully 
depict the different kinds of atoms and bonds found in the molecule, and 
show how they are geometrically arranged in relation to one another.
Weisberg’s account of scientific modeling emphasizes “the role of the-
orists’ intentions in all aspects of modeling” including “the evaluation of 
the goodness of fit between models and the world” (4). Without discerning 
the intentions of the model-builder (at least implicitly), we cannot assess 
whether a model successfully represents its target, because the intentions of 
the model builder are what constitute the resemblance relationship between 
model and target. In general, according to Weisberg, a model appropriately 
resembles its target when it “shares certain highly-valued features, doesn’t 
have many highly-valued features missing, and when the target doesn’t 
have many significant features that the model lacks” (144–145).9 But mod-
el-builders and their research communities must judge for themselves exact-
ly which features of a model and its target are highly-valued and significant. 
These judgments are complex, interpretive, and context-dependent: “The 
model–world relationship depends on theorists’ intentions, the background 
knowledge and practice of their research communities, and their research 
9 This appeal to resemblance obviously raises legitimate worries in a theological con-
text. On many accounts, God and creatures share no features at all, for instance. 
I address these concerns below.
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goals” (135). Modeling is a deeply communal and hermeneutical practice: 
we can only construe a model properly when we accurately interpret the 
intentions of its builders in the context of their own research community.
Theorists can intentionally construct models without any real-world 
targets at all, or even models with physically impossible targets. For ex-
ample, a biologist might model the behavior of a hypothetical organism 
that has no real-world analogue (121–122), or a physicist might model 
a perpetual-motion machine, even though such a machine could not pos-
sibly exist, given the actual laws of nature (126–129). Even so, the model 
could help the physicist better understand the consequences of those laws, 
or see which laws would have to change in order for such a machine to be 
possible. Model-builders “ultimately aim to partition the space of possi-
bilities. They want to understand what is possible, what is impossible, and 
why” (128). Alternatively, a model might not have any target because the 
object of study is simply the model itself (129–134). Models like this can 
“sensitize our imagination, so that we learn how to notice things that we 
might have missed otherwise” (130).
2. Modeling the Triune God: Brower and Rea  
on the Logical Problem of the Trinity
Weisberg’s account of scientific models can also help us to understand 
theological and philosophical models. Of course, we should not expect 
an account of scientific modeling to correspond exactly to the practice of 
modeling in theology or philosophy. It is far from obvious that a theolog-
ical “model” of the atonement or the trinity would fall into any of Weis-
berg’s own categories, for example. Even so, having looked more carefully 
at the practice of scientific modeling, some aspects of analytic theological 
modeling do come into sharper focus.
Like scientific models, theological models posit some kind of resem-
blance relationship between model and target. When the “target” is God, 
however, that relationship must be very remote. Indeed, some would argue 
that there can be no such relationship at all: a robust respect for divine 
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transcendence seems to commit us to the view that no created thing can 
resemble God in any respect. For the most part, however, the orthodox 
Christian tradition has not held this view. Instead, the dominant tradition 
has argued that things in the world do resemble God, albeit remotely, just 
because they are created. There is therefore no reason to reject the very 
idea of models of God. As we have seen, the resemblance relationship es-
tablished between a scientific model and its target is often very remote as 
well. The practice of modeling as such does not presuppose a high degree 
of similarity between model and target. And so with respect to analytic 
models of God, we should not assume that just because they are models 
that they are inherently overreaching and idolatrous.
Furthermore, as Weisberg shows, we cannot interpret a model without 
understanding the intentions of its builder, set in the context of his or her 
research community. What problems is the model intended to address? 
How does the modeler construe the relationship between model and target, 
and by what criteria of fidelity does he intend for the model to be assessed? 
Whether in physics, philosophy, or theology, we must ask and answer such 
questions before we are in a position to judge the value of a given model.
Consider, for example, Jeffrey Brower and Michael Rea’s well-known 
model of the Trinity, based on the Aristotelian account of “numerical same-
ness without identity” (Brower and Rea 2005). On their model, we can un-
derstand the relationship between the three divine persons and the one 
divine nature as analogous to the relationship between a bronze statue and 
the bronze that constitutes it. Plausibly – so they argue – the statue and the 
bronze count as exactly one object (they are numerically the same). Yet the 
statue is not strictly identical to the bronze, since they do not share exactly 
the same properties or persistence conditions: we can destroy the statue 
(by melting it down, say) without destroying the bronze.10 Similarly, we can 
think of the divine essence as playing the role of matter in a form–matter 
compound, and the persons as numerically distinct beings constituted by 
three numerically-distinct forms.
10 I here introduce Brower and Rea’s model only as an illustration of analytic modeling. 
For criticism of the model, see Hasker 2013, 129–38.
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Brower and Rea offer an excellent example of a theological model, 
whether or not it succeeds as a model of the trinity. In laying out their 
model, they begin with a clear statement about the problem it is meant 
to solve: the logical problem of the trinity, the worry that the doctrine 
of the trinity seems to imply that there is exactly one divine being, since 
there is only one God, but also that there are three divine beings, since the 
Father, the Son, and the Spirit, are each identical to God but not to each 
other (Brower and Rea 2005, 58–60). By successfully modeling the doc-
trine of the trinity, we would acquire some evidence that we do not need 
to violate our ordinary standards of logical reasoning to affirm that God 
is triune. There are communities in which such evidence might be of little 
interest, but there are also some communities that would regard it as very 
valuable indeed. Thus, the context of their model, and their intentions in 
offering it are important. They aim to address a fairly narrow, but very im-
portant, challenge to the fundamental coherence of Trinitarian doctrine. 
Their relevant research community – their intended audience – comprises 
philosophers, theologians, and others who remain troubled by this specific 
challenge. It would therefore be a mistake to criticize their model on the 
grounds that it does not adequately address other challenges that are more 
salient to other communities. For instance, they do not propose that their 
model is adequate for doxology or liturgy; they do not seek to show that the 
doctrine of trinity is grounded in scripture or tradition; nor do they relate 
their model of the trinity to other contemporary projects in constructive 
trinitarian theology like political emancipation.
Brower and Rea also specify the exact fidelity criteria by which they 
wish their model to be judged. For instance, it must be “clearly consistent 
with the view that Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are divine individuals, and 
that there is exactly one divine individual,” and it must not “conflict with 
a natural reading of either the Bible or the ecumenical creeds.”11 To the 
11 They enumerate five criteria in total (Brower and Rea 2005, 59): “(D1) It is clearly 
consistent with the view that Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are divine individuals, and 
that there is exactly one divine individual; (D2) It does not conflict with a natural 
reading of either the Bible or the ecumenical creeds; (D3) It is consistent with the 
view that God is an individual rather than a society, and that the Persons are not 
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extent that their model fails to satisfy these criteria, it fails on its own 
terms. At the same time, for their model to succeed in a broader sense, their 
research community must agree that these fidelity criteria are appropriate. 
This fact reflects a general point about modeling: theorists are entitled to 
specify the criteria by which they wish their models to be judged, but they 
cannot simply stipulate any criteria whatsoever in order to ensure that 
their models succeed – at least not if they also hope to persuade others that 
their models are valuable.
Across different research communities, and even within a single re-
search community, and scholars might well disagree about whether a set 
of fidelity criteria are appropriate. When we recognize the social and inter-
pretive aspects of scientific modeling, we can see one reason why analytic 
theological models are often welcomed by philosophers of religion but re-
jected by theologians. Philosophers of religion and theologians constitute 
two very different research communities. These communities will often 
differ about what counts as a salient problem, and so will be skeptical of 
models aimed at solving problems that they themselves do not recognize. 
Moreover, each community will assess a model with its own fidelity crite-
ria, and these are likely to be very different. For example, contemporary 
(non-analytic) theologians might insist on criteria related to love and po-
litical justice, for instance, which would seem utterly out of place to their 
analytic counterparts. For their part, philosophers of religion and analytic 
theologians often boggle at the fact that other theologians (for the most 
part) do not seem especially worried about the logical problem of the trin-
ity.12 In principle, however, this is not any more unusual than the fact that 
chemists do not seem especially worried about the fact that two funda-
mental theories of physics (general relativity and quantum field theory) are 
parts of God; (D4) It is consistent with the view that classical identity exists and is 
not to be analyzed in terms of more fundamental sortal- relativized sameness rela-
tions like being the same person as; (D5) It carries no anti-realist commitments in 
metaphysics.”
12 “Systematic theology of recent vintage has done surprisingly little to address this 
dilemma. Given that many of these theologians criticized the traditional (especially 
Latin) formulations, it is both surprising and disappointing that they have not set 
themselves to the task of addressing the problem” (McCall 2010) 11–12).
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incompatible. Chemists and physicists comprise different research commu-
nities oriented around different problems that arise from different levels 
of engagement with the natural world. Similarly, even though theologians 
engage with the doctrine of the trinity at a different level than philoso-
phers of religion, it does not follow that they engage with that doctrine at 
the wrong level.
Brower and Rea are also clear throughout that their model is just that 
– a model. The problem of material constitution is analogous to the logical 
problem of the trinity, because the two are structurally similar: they both 
pose questions about numerical sameness without strict identity (Brower 
and Rea 2005, 57). Brower and Rea recognize that there are also “obvious 
disanalogies” between the two problems, and therefore obvious disanalo-
gies between their model and the divine nature itself:
For example, in contrast to ordinary material objects, the role of matter in 
the case of the trinity is played by immaterial stuff, and so the structures or 
compounds constituted from the divine essence (namely, the divine persons) 
will be ‘hylomorphic’ only in an extended sense. Also, in the case of material 
objects, the form of a particular hylomorphic compound will typically only be 
contingently instantiated by the matter. Not so, however, in the case of the 
Trinity. For Christian orthodoxy requires us to say that properties like being 
a Father and being a Son are essentially such as to be instantiated by the di-
vine essence. As we have seen, moreover, the relation of accidental sameness 
on which our solution is modeled is, in Aristotle anyway, paradigmatically 
a relation between a substance (e.g., a man) and a hylomorphic structure built 
out of the substance and an accidental property. The Persons, however, are not 
like this. Thus, it is at best misleading to say that the relation between them is 
one of accidental sameness (Brower and Rea 2005, 68–69).
We should take their concession in this paragraph seriously, as a sign that 
they are trying to keep their own theoretical hubris in check. It is clear 
that they do not intend for their model to map perfectly onto the Godhead. 
They do not see their model as a way of capturing or fully comprehending 
the divine nature. They believe (unsurprisingly) that theirs is currently the 
best analytic model of the trinity on offer, but they do not go so far as to 
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say that it is unsurpassable, or the only correct way to understand God’s 
three-in-oneness.
In fact, although they do not say so explicitly, Brower and Rea might 
even agree that their model does not actually yield knowledge about the 
divine nature at all. Certainly it does not tell us what the divine essence 
really is. Nor does it specify how the divine essence necessarily and simul-
taneously constitutes three distinct persons. Indeed, they insist that the 
analogy with a bronze statue breaks down at these very points. In a sense, 
their model is best understood as simply a more extended, and more tech-
nical, instance of the venerable genre of useful-but-imperfect trinitarian 
analogies: the human mind, a river fed by multiple streams, a rainbow, and 
so forth.
This point deserves emphasis. For a variety of reasons, contemporary 
theologians are wont to treat analogical speech and analogical reasoning 
as theologically virtuous, and to equate univocal speech and reasoning 
with idolatry. For better or worse, they also tend to assume that analytic 
philosophers of religion, and therefore analytic theologians, are essentially 
committed to an invidious univocity.13 As we look more carefully at analytic 
models of God, however, it becomes clear that they actually belong on the 
“analogy” side of the analogy / univocity distinction. Analogical reasoning 
is central to the practice of analytic philosophical theology. That is why the 
practice of model-building is so common.
13 Stephen R. Holmes (2012, 32) writes “More basically, analytic discussions of the 
Trinity seem generally to proceed with a remarkable confidence about the success 
of language in referring to the divine. The theological question of analogy is, as far 
as I can observe, never raised, and the assumed answer would always seem to be 
that language refers univocally to the divine and the created. (If it does not, the core 
project of analysis would be impossible.)” (Holmes 2012, 32). For his part, David 
Bentley Hart (2013, 125) argues that analytic philosophers of religion – gripped as 
they are by a Fregean notion of existence – find it very had to “make much sense of 
the ancient and necessary premise, common to all classical theistic philosophies, 
that the words we use about God…have meanings only remotely analogous to what 
those same words mean when we use them of created things.” See also Burrell 2008.
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3. Modeling as Mystery-Discerning
I presented an account of scientific modeling that draws on the best work 
in contemporary philosophy of science. I then applied that account to 
a prominent analytic model of the trinity, in order to show that a better 
grasp of scientific modeling can help us to see the value of theological 
modeling. Given Brower and Rea’s own intentions, and given their research 
community, their model is best understood as a very well-developed anal-
ogy – a contemporary instance of the venerable genre of trinitarian analo-
gies – rather than an idolatrous attempt to grasp God fully or completely.
Still, the old worries linger. Even if Brower and Rea should prove inno-
cent of the idolatry charge, perhaps they are only accidentally innocent. 
The real problem is not with this-or-that specific model, but with the sci-
entific pretensions that drive the very practice of model-building itself. 
Rowan Williams forcefully presses this point:
If theology is understood primarily as a “science” in the common understand-
ing of that term, it will assume that its job is to clarify, perhaps to explain; it 
will seek to establish procedures for arguing and criteria for conclusions; it 
will be interested in whether or not there are good reasons for saying this or 
that…But the history of theology does not look very much like what this ac-
count might suggest… There is a rigor and discipline appropriate to theology, 
but it is the rigor of keeping on the watch for our constant tendency to claim 
the “total perspective”: it is almost a rigor directed against the naïve scientific 
model (2000, 13).
In short, to return to a distinction I presented above, theology is not a prob-
lem solving enterprise but a mystery discerning enterprise. To say that the-
ology is a mystery discerning enterprise is to say, with Williams, that theol-
ogy must always discipline itself against its constant tendency to claim the 
“total perspective” in matters divine.14 God infinitely transcends all that 
14 For example, T.F Torrance (1998, 24–25, 28–29) writes: “…everything that is affirmed 
in the Creed falls within the compass of faith pivoting upon the objective reality of 
God who infinitely transcends all that we can think or say about him… By its very na-
ture, then, Christian faith is locked into an inexhaustible depth of truth in God which 
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we can think or say. The more we come to know God in faith, the more we 
realize that God necessarily surpasses all understanding. The practice of 
model-building seeks to dispel divine mysteries and so (it seems) remains 
inappropriate for genuine theology.
Notwithstanding my own analytic inclinations, I have considerable 
sympathy for this position. Even so, I would resist any sharp distinction 
between “problem solving” and “mystery discerning.” It is precisely be-
cause theology is a mystery discerning enterprise that it is also a problem 
solving enterprise. Thus, even theologians in the “mystery discerning” 
camp should still welcome at least some forms of analytic modeling. They 
should especially welcome models that are explicitly intended as hypothet-
ical or targetless models. As we have seen, scientists sometimes construct 
models that do not even purport to have real-world targets (Weisberg 2013, 
114–134). Similarly, analytic theologians can construct theological models 
that do not even purport to map onto God as God really is. Such models do 
not impede, but rather aid, the task of discerning the mystery of God. We 
might even go so far as to call them apophatic models.
For example, suppose we treat Brower and Rea’s model as a “targetless” 
model of the trinity. On this interpretation, we stipulate that their model is 
targetless because it has no concretely existing, real-world target, since (we 
may suppose) its target cannot be the unknowable, triune God. The mod-
el’s target is therefore not God-as-triune, but something more abstract: 
the doctrine of the trinity. God-as-triune cannot be modeled (let us agree) 
but surely the doctrine of the trinity can be.15 After all, the doctrine of the 
trinity is not the unknowable creator of all that exists, nor does it infinitely 
always exceeds what we may grasp of its disclosure to us]… It is right there, where 
the Scriptures bear upon the ineffable mystery of God which remains mystery even in 
the heart of his self-revelation, that we must be on our guard against irreverent and 
impious intrusion into what God has kept secret in his own eternal being.”
15 Catherine Mowry LaCugna (1986, 175) makes this point nicely: “while it is true that 
God is (absolute) mystery, it is not true that a doctrine is a mystery. Doctrines are 
simply doctrines, that is, human formulations which are meant to shed light on re-
ligious experience.” Furthermore, to say that the doctrine of the trinity can be mod-
eled is not to say that it can be deduced by natural reason alone. Once can accept 
both that the doctrine of the trinity had to be revealed, and that once it has been 
revealed, it can be modeled.
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transcend human thought and speech. Even if the doctrine of the trinity 
had to have been revealed, because it could never have been discovered 
by human beings, the sheer fact that it has been revealed means that it is 
no longer unknowable, since it has been explicitly presented to us for our 
assent.16
Call the “doctrine of the trinity” the set of axioms that are jointly 
necessary and sufficient to express the orthodox trinitarian faith. (These 
axioms might be identified with the propositional content of the Nicene 
Creed, for instance.) A model of the trinity would then be an interpreted 
structure that satisfies all of the doctrine’s axioms (Giere 1988, 79; Potter 
2004, 74). In other words, it would be a model of “God” on which all of the 
doctrine’s axioms come out as true. But because the unknowable triune 
God would not be the target of the model, we would have no license to 
assume that the “God” of the model corresponds to the unknowable triune 
God. That assumption – that the “God” of the model corresponds to the 
unknowable triune God – might be an act of conceptual idolatry, one that 
a dedicated member of the mystery discerning camp should resist. But 
we do not need to make that assumption at all. Both the model’s builder 
and the research community for which the model is intended can deny it 
consistently.
What would be the point of such a model? The point is this: the mys-
tery of the trinity is not the “mystery” of how a logical contradiction can 
be true. It follows that an analytic model that addresses the logical prob-
lem of the trinity does not thereby dispel the mystery of the trinity. Quite 
the contrary. By showing that the doctrine of the trinity does not express 
a bare logical contradiction, an analytic model actually removes a signif-
icant barrier to discerning the real mystery of the trinity. We are better 
able to appreciate the mystery of the trinity in all its depth when we ap-
preciate that the doctrine of the trinity is not a bare logical contradiction. 
16 We must be careful about distinguishing between the doctrine of the trinity per se, 
its various creedal formulations and liturgical expressions, and God-as-trinitarian. 
We worship God-as-trinitarian by reciting the Nicene Creed, which expresses the 
doctrine of the trinity.
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It is important not to misunderstand this claim. It is not the claim that 
the rationality of the trinitarian Christian faith depends on the success of 
this-or-that analytic model of the trinity. Nor is it that one can only discern 
the mystery of the trinity once the logical problem has been “solved.” My 
claim is far more modest: we are better able to discern the mystery of the 
trinity when we appreciate that the doctrine of the trinity is not a logical 
contradiction. This worry may not arise for all research communities, but 
it does arise for some.
I offer a second example. Analytic theologians and philosophers of 
religion frequently construct models of the divine attributes (Leftow 2009, 
167–198; Wierenga 1989). These models can also be construed as “ap-
ophatic” models that enhance our appreciation for the divine mystery. 
Consider, for example, an analytic model of divine omnipotence. Some 
theologians hold that God’s power differs utterly from the kind of power 
possessed by creatures, such that it transcends even the maximum possible 
degree of creaturely power (Hart 2013, 125–126). These theologians would 
insist that analytic models of omnipotence cannot really be about divine 
power at all. Because they are actually models of maximal creaturely power, 
they miss their divine target and fall into idolatry.
Suppose, however, that we grant this charge but deny its implications. 
Suppose, that is, that we treat analytic models of omnipotence as deliber-
ately-constructed examples of targetless modeling, rather than as uninten-
tional misfires that try but fail to hit their divine target. On this understand-
ing, we would explicitly intend to model divine omnipotence on maximal 
creaturely power. At the same time, we would know from the outset that our 
model can have no target. The model can have no created target, since no 
really-existing creature actually possesses maximal power. And it can have 
no divine target, since (ex hypothesi) divine power does not “exist” on the 
same metaphysical plane as creaturely power and so cannot be modeled.
In my view, we could still learn a great deal from such a model. A model 
of maximal creaturely power would show the precise limit that God’s ulti-
mate power incomprehensibly transcends. The same point would hold for 
other models of other divine attributes. A model of omniscience that cap-
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tured only maximal creaturely knowledge would not thereby fail – rather, 
it would succeed at showing the limit that God’s knowledge transcends. 
And even if God’s goodness is utterly unlike creaturely goodness, as some 
Thomists insist, we might still learn something valuable about God’s good-
ness by modeling maximal moral perfection in creatures. Once we clearly 
grasp the relevant creaturely limit, we are even more likely to appreciate 
just how awesome divine power, knowledge, and goodness really is. When 
we model the divine attributes we do not dispel the mystery of God. On the 
contrary, we take tentative steps toward discerning it more fully.17
Conclusion
A better understanding of scientific modeling can help allay some common 
worries about analytic theological modeling. We should not assume that 
every attempt to model the divine displays idolatrous confidence in the 
power of reason. Theological models do not have to be treated as efforts 
to comprehend God fully by means of finite human concepts. A model is 
an interpreted structure, hermeneutical through and through. In order to 
interpret any model, we must also interpret the intentions of its builder 
and the practices of his or her research community. When those intentions 
and practices are appropriately modest, theological models can escape the 
charge of idolatry. Indeed, model-building can even be something like an 
apophatic practice. We can build hypothetical models or targetless models 
that explicitly aim to describe that which God is not, in order to see that 
God transcends all creaturely limitations.
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